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Abstract
Standard accounts of convention include notions of arbitrariness. But
many have conceived of conventionality as an all or nothing affair. In
this paper, I develop a framework for thinking of conventions as coming
in degrees of arbitrariness. In doing so, I introduce an information the-
oretic measure intended to capture the degree to which a solution to a
certain social problem could have been otherwise. As the paper argues,
this framework can help improve explanation aimed at the cultural evolu-
tion of social traits. Good evolutionary explanations recognize that most
functional traits are also conventional, at least to some degree, and vice
versa.
1 Introduction
Driving on the right side of the road is a classic case of convention. This is a
stable pattern of behavior that benefits those involved by preventing car crashes,
but it could have been otherwise. In many countries, drivers stay to the left.
Another classic case is that of linguistic conventions of word meaning. In En-
glish, the word “fork” refers to the metal, four-tined tool we use to eat. This
pattern of usage allows English speakers to communicate, but could have been
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otherwise. Any number of words might have come to refer to this tool, just as
successfully.
In his 1969 Convention, David Lewis used game theory to develop an influ-
ential account of convention. We will say more later about the specifics. One
key aspect, though, is that conventions are univocal. Either something is a
convention, or not. But in many cases conventions come in degrees. A central
aspect of all accounts of convention is that they are patterns of behavior that are
arbitrary in the sense that they could have been otherwise. (And throughout
the paper, when I speak of conventions being arbitrary, this is what I will mean.)
But in some cases, there is a more real sense in which a convention could have
been otherwise. In the driving case just described, for instance, there are only
two options for which side of the road to drive on. On the other hand, there are
are an enormous number of words that might have been used instead of “fork”,
and the likelihood that another culture would develop the same linguistic con-
vention is very low. Arguably the sense in which the “fork” convention could
have been otherwise is stronger.
Some previous authors have argued that conventions can come in degrees
of arbitrariness. The goal of this paper is to develop a framework for think-
ing about what this involves, including a concrete proposal for how we might
measure these degrees. In particular, I draw on cultural evolutionary modelling
tools, and on information theory, to develop this framework and measure. The
central idea is that situations where the endpoint of a cultural evolutionary pro-
cess is less predictable, or more surprising, are more informative, and thus, we
might wish to say, more arbitrary.
As will become clear, there are some difficulties for the account I sketch.
Most importantly, there are multiple ways to represent any one situation. Be-
cause the measure I develop is representation dependent, the choice of repre-
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sentation will determine the level of measured arbitrariness. But, as I argue,
attending to the explanatory aims of a project can help determine what sort of
representation is best suited. And in the paper, I will describe multiple cases
where the framework here has useful applications, including to thinking about
gendered division of labor, indirect requests, color categories, and patterns of
word order.
One main goal of this framework is to improve evolutionary explanation. In
explaining the presence or persistence of a cultural trait, we often appeal to
functionality, i.e., a trait emerges and persists by dint of improving the well-
being or fitness of those employing it. Conventions, on the other hand, are often
explained as arbitrary, or the result of chance occurrences. The framework here
contributes to recent work that attempts to break down this division. Most
cultural traits are functional, to some degree, and yet still could have been
otherwise, to some degree, and can only be successfully explained as such. In
addition, as we will see, when theorists argue over the degree to which a cultural
trait is innate, the measure presented here can be useful.
In section 2 I discuss what conventions are, and where they come from, be-
ginning with Lewis, and focusing on philosophers who argue that conventions
come in degrees. I also draw on the work of Brian Skyrms to introduce an
evolutionary framework that can represent the cultural emergence of conven-
tion. This will set the stage for section 3 where I introduce the measure of
arbitrariness. In this section, I also discuss some worries about the measure,
including about choosing a representation, and about dealing with probabilities
and counterfactuals. The next two sections introduce several applications of
the measure. Section 4 discusses gendered division of labor. Section 5 discusses
human language, including indirect requests, word order, and color categories.
Section 6 concludes with some brief thoughts about the applicability of this
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framework to biological conventions.
2 Games and Conventions
In this section I outline how Lewis, and subsequent authors, have used game
theory to analyze convention. Then I address how evolutionary models can
provide a fuller dynamical picture of their emergence. Throughout, I pay special
attention to the idea that conventions might come in degrees of arbitrariness.
2.1 Coordination Games and Conventionality
The account of convention presented by Lewis (1969) starts with games. A
game, in the game theoretic sense, is a representation of a strategic interaction,
i.e., one involving multiple actors where it matters to each what the others
do. Games are defined by four things. Players are the individuals involved.
Strategies are the behavioral options for these players. Payoffs define, for each
combination of strategies, the utility each player gets.1 In addition, games
typically define information, or what each player knows about the structure of
the game, and their interactive partner(s).2
Lewis introduces a coordination game, where actors would like to coordinate
their actions, but have multiple ways to do so. The game has two players—player
1 and player 2—with two strategies each—A and B. The payoffs are illustrated
in the payoff table shown in figure 1. Player 1’s strategies are listed in the rows
and player 2’s in the columns. Each entry gives payoffs for a combination of
strategies, with player 1 first.
1Although there are worries about the concept of utility, these are beyond our purview
here. We can take utility to be a representation of what an agent wants, desires, or acts to
get. When we move to evolutionary models payoffs will instead represent drivers of evolution.
2We will not say too much about information in this paper, since ultimately we will focus
on evolutionary models where information becomes less important. But as we will see, for
Lewis information, and especially common knowledge, is a central aspect of his account of
convention.
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Figure 1: A simple coordination game.
Because the goal is to coordinate, players get a payoff of 1 whenever they
choose the same strategy, and 0 otherwise. This game could represent, for
instance, the driving situation described in the Introduction, with A and B
corresponding to the left and right side of the road.
For Lewis, conventions are usefully thought of as a special sort of equilib-
rium in games with multiple equilibria. The coordination game just introduced
has two Nash equilibria, or sets of strategies where neither player can unilat-
erally switch and improve their payoff—A v. A and B v. B. Lewis introduces
a refinement which he calls a proper coordination equilibrium—where no player
can unilaterally change strategies and improve payoff for any other player. He
uses these to identify possible conventions in games, including the two Nash
equilibria just described.
For Lewis, game theory gives a precise notion of why conventions might
emerge as stable behavioral patterns—at equilibrium each player has a payoff
incentive to keep playing the same strategy. In addition, it gives a clear notion
of arbitrariness—there are two proper coordination equilibria in this game that
the players might have selected. Notice that for Lewis “arbitrariness” of a
convention is synonymous with a live possibility that the pattern of behavior
in question could have been otherwise. (And, as noted, this is the sense of
arbitrariness relevant to the project here.)
To complete his account, Lewis describes specific conditions under which a
group playing a proper coordination equilibrium will be at a convention. Mem-
bers of a group must conform to an equilibrium, must expect other group mem-
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bers to conform, must prefer to conform when others do, and must prefer each
member to conform when the group does. In addition, Lewis stipulates that
group members must have very similar preferences over the equilibria, and must
all have common knowledge that the conditions of the convention obtain.
Some of Lewis’s conditions have been convincingly critiqued. It is beyond
the purview of this paper to overview this literature. And ultimately, one of my
aims will be to show that giving necessary and sufficient conditions for whether
something is or is not a convention is not a useful way to go in any case. For
our purposes, the important take-away from Lewis is that many conventions are
usefully represented as populations playing equilibria of games.
Gilbert (1992) in critiquing Lewis, points out that in some cases all of Lewis’s
conditions will hold, but one equilibrium will be notably better, or more attrac-
tive, than the other . Consider the game in figure 2, and suppose that x = 100.
Both A v. A and B v. B are still proper coordination equilibria, and thus can-
didates for conventions on Lewis’s account. But suppose the players settle on
the B equilibrium. Although the choice is arbitrary in that it could have been
otherwise, that could does not seem very strong. Furthermore, if we were to
explain why the players chose the B equilibrium, we would want a functional
explanation that appeals to payoffs, rather than just to chance.
Figure 2: A coordination game where B v. B is the preferable equilibrium
assuming x > 1.
Lewis argues that when the alternatives to behaviors are of a “deficient
sort”, a group will not be able to generate common knowledge that others will
conform to the behavior. Thus, for Lewis the worse equilibrium will not actually
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be a viable alternative convention in this case. But we might imagine a set of
games where x ranged from 1 to 100. Instead of following Lewis in claiming
that at some point the situation changes from one with conventions to one
without, it seems more perspicuous to say that there is a range of cases where
the conventions are more or less arbitrary.
Millikan (2005), concerned primarily with human language, defines a con-
vention as something that is unlikely to emerge a second time. However, if a
group developed a new convention for driving, it is actually quite likely they
would end up with a right-side driving convention. (Absent other factors, we
might think there is a 50% chance of this.) Again, we might want to say in this
case that there is a range of arbitrariness between driving conventions, with two
possible equilibria, and word choice, where the possibilities are highly numerous.
In other words, both differences in the payoffs of the game and the number of
strategies seem to determine how arbitrary the resulting conventions will be.
Motivated by such cases, some authors have argued we should think of con-
ventions as coming in degrees of arbitrariness (though, in general, philosophical
accounts have not focused on this aspect of convention (Rescorla, 2019)). Re-
garding linguistic implicature, Morgan (1977) argues that there are many cases
that are both conventional and “natural”. Following Morgan, Simons and Zoll-
man (2019) introduce the notion of a natural convention to discuss indirect
requests. In section 5 we discuss their arguments, but for now what is relevant
is their thinking about degrees of naturalness, which provides a starting point
for the rest of the paper. They define three dimensions along which a convention
could be more or less natural (vs. arbitrary). (1) Some conventions are better,
from a payoff standpoint. (2) Some conventions are more likely to emerge. And
(3), some conventions are more stable than others. Once they have emerged,
they are not likely to be abandoned.
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For the game in figure 2, when x > 1 the B convention is more natural in
sense (1)—it is superior from a payoff perspective. To see what Simons and
Zollman (2019) have in mind for their other two scales of naturalness, and also
to set us up for the measure introduced in the next section, we will now switch
to an evolutionary game theoretic perspective.
2.2 Modeling Evolving Conventions
Lewis (1969) arguably set the stage for such a perspective, but he did not develop
it. Notice his definition does not specify how a group arrives at a convention.
He supplemented it with a claim that conventions involve mutual expectations
about future behavior. I expect you to conform, and I expect that you expect
me to conform, etc. These expectations can develop for different reasons, but
often result from past behavior. If we have conformed in the past, and both
benefited, we have reason to expect conformity in the future.
Subsequent authors, especially Brian Skyrms, have used evolutionary game
theory to develop a fully dynamical picture of the emergence of conventions
(Rescorla, 2019; Skyrms, 2010; O’Connor, 2019a). In such models, a group
engages in repeated strategic interaction. Over time they change strategies as
a result of natural selection, learning, or cultural evolution. The models start
with a game and add dynamics—a set of rules stipulating how the population
will change.
In such models, groups often end up at equilibrium. This need not involve
common knowledge or complicated sets of expectations, but we might nonethe-
less think of it as a process by which a convention emerges. For instance, a
group playing the game in figure 1 might learn to all play A, and thus solve
their coordination problem. The equilibrium involves a self-reinforcing pattern
of behavior that might have been otherwise.
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Evolutionary models allow us to specify what Simons and Zollman (2019)
mean by conventions being (2) more or less likely to emerge, and (3) more or
less stable. Suppose a group learns to play the game in figure 2. And suppose
they change strategies by imitating group members who do well. We can use the
replicator dynamics to represent this state of affairs. Over time this dynamics
selects for strategies that do better than average. For this reason, it tracks
both natural selection and cultural imitation well (Weibull, 1997). Under these
dynamics, when x = 1 the population evolves to play A whenever more than
50% of its members play A, otherwise B.3
Figure 3 shows a phase diagram, a representation of all the possible popu-
lation states of a group with two strategies—A or B. To the far left of the line,
we have the state where every actor plays A, and to the far right, B. The center
point is where 50% of actors play each. The two black spots on the ends of the
line show the equilibria (all A or all B). When the population is exactly split,
neither strategy does better than the other, so neither is winning. For every
other point, though, the population moves towards the two equilibria. We can
also identify what are called basins of attraction—the set of starting points that
end up at each rest equilibrium. The two basins of attraction are the two halves
of the diagram, and are of equal size.
Figure 3: A phase diagram for a simple coordination game.
For a coordination game where x > 1, the B equilibrium is more “natural”
3For the game in figure 1 the replicator dynamics yield one equation for the change in A
(the change in B is 1 minus this): x˙ = 3x2 − x − 2x3. Notice that x˙ = 0 when x = 0, .5, 1.
These are the rest points of the model. When 0 ≤ x ≤ .5 the ride hand side of the equation
will yield a negative number. I.e., when the proportion of A is less than half, it decreases
further. When .5 ≤ x ≤ 1 the proportion of A is increasing.
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in sense (1) of yielding higher payoffs. And as a result it will also have a larger
basin of attraction. If x = 50, the phase diagram for this model will look like
the one shown in figure 4. The basin of attraction for A makes up only 2% of
the space, and 98% for B. If we do not know much about the starting place of
the population, we can take these basins to represent the probability that each
outcome evolves. So on the second scale, again, B is a more natural convention.
Figure 4: A phase diagram for a simple coordination game where one option
yields significantly higher payoffs.
Here, the first two senses of naturalness align because actors playing B tend
to do better on average due to its high payoffs. There will be cases where these
senses pull apart, though, describing these goes beyond the purview of this
paper.
The notion of stability of an equilibrium (naturalness (3)) can typically be
assessed by asking: what portion of the population needs to deviate from the
equilibrium to disrupt it? Imagine a population at the A equilibrium in figure
3. If a few individuals switch to B, the group will evolve right back to A.
But for the model in figure 4, only 3% of individuals need to switch to disrupt
the A equilibrium, i.e., it is less stable. Again, for this model the more stable
convention (3) also tends to evolve (2) and have higher payoffs (1). And, again,
there are cases where these pull apart, but we do not explore them here.
At this point, we have an evolutionary framework that illustrates the ar-
gument from Simons and Zollman (2019) about naturalness. As these authors
point out, thinking of conventions as coming in degrees matters to cultural
evolutionary explanations. (See also O’Connor (2019b).) In particular, these
explanations often appeal to adaptiveness or to chance, but rarely to both. If we
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recognize that conventions come in degrees, an accurate explanation will appeal
to both their adaptive character and to chance.
3 Measuring Conventionality
I now present a measure capturing the degree to which a conventional outcome
could have been otherwise. In doing so, I move away from the three division scale
proposed by Simons and Zollman (2019), and focus mostly on their second sense
of naturalness—probability of emergence. This arguably best tracks whether a
convention really could have been otherwise. (Though shortly we will see that
sense 3 can also be addressed using the measure.) Could some other outcome
have emerged on a cultural evolutionary time-scale, and how likely is it to have
done so? In answering this, I draw on information theory, first introduced by
Shannon (1948), which it typically used to address questions related to the
transfer of information.
What is the connection between information theory and convention? As we
have seen, different equilibria can have different probabilities of emerging. Equi-
libria with large basins of attraction are more likely to evolve than small ones.4
The sizes of the basins thus tell us something about how much information we
gain, for some domain, upon seeing what evolved. This level of information will
be our measure of arbitrariness. It is higher when there is a lot of uncertainty
about what will evolve, and lower for less uncertainty. To be clear, the reason
I use information theory here (rather than some other framework) is that it
simply is the theory that deals with questions like: how much do we learn upon
observing the outcome of a variable process?
The relevant information theoretic measure is Shannon entropy which tells
us, for some channel, how much information on average is transmitted.5 An
4This is not exactly right. More on this shortly.
5A channel is just a variable that can transfer information by being in different states. The
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amount of information corresponds, intuitively, to how much we learn upon
observing something, or how surprised we are to see it. The entropy measure
is:
H(x) =
∑
i
P (xi)I(xi) (1)
H(x) is entropy. It is calculated by taking the sum, over all the possible
signals, i, that can come through a channel, of the probabilities of those signals
(P (xi)) multiplied by the information contained in each (I(xi)). The infor-
mation per signal I(xi) is equal to −log2P (xi). Why? The negative log of
P (x) is 0 when P (x) = 1, so a completely certain signal carries no information.
This makes sense as we learn nothing upon observing it. As P (x) decreases,
−log2P (x) increases arbitrarily, meaning that the more unlikely a signal is, the
more information it carries. I.e., we learn more upon observing it. Using −log2
will give us the number of bits in a signal. Another log gives a different unit of
information. Altogether, the measure weights the probability that each signal is
sent by the amount of information in that signal to give the average information
in the channel.
For example, consider a channel that reports the results of an unbiased coin
flip. The probability of heads is PH = .5, and tails PT = .5. The information
gained upon observing either of these is −log2(.5) = 1. The entropy is then
.5 ∗ 1 + .5 ∗ 1 = 1. So on average there is 1 bit of information transferred.
Other things being equal, a channel has higher entropy when the signals
being sent are closer to equiprobable. If so, we learn more on average than
if, say, one signal is sent 99% of the time, and the other 1%. The entropy of
choice of what counts as a channel is somewhat arbitrary, i.e., channels can be conceptualized
in different ways.
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this biased channel is just .08. A channel will also have higher entropy, holding
other things equal, when there are more signals. The more messages we might
receive, the more we learn upon observing any single one.
Let us connect this to our evolutionary models. We take the sizes of the
basins of attraction to be our probabilities P (i). Thus, arbitrariness is higher
whenever we learn more, on average, upon observing the outcome of an evolu-
tionary process. If there are more equilibria, or their basins of attraction are
closer to equally sized, then, holding other aspects fixed, the problem will be
more arbitrary, or, we might say, “more conventional”.
Notice that while Simons and Zollman (2019) defined naturalness for a par-
ticular convention (i.e., B is more natural than A), this measure gives us a level
of arbitrariness for a domain. Solutions to x social situation are more arbitrary
than solutions to y situation. We can also specify, though, the information
value of any particular outcome, −log2P (x). We can use this to specify the nat-
uralness of a particular convention a la Simons and Zollman (2019). The closer
−log2P (x) is to 0, the more natural the convention. In other words, information
theory gives us the tools to measure and discuss both how natural a particular
evolutionary outcome is, and also how arbitrary solutions to some problem are,
on average. In the rest of the paper, though, we will focus on the latter.
Once we employ the measure, we can see that there is only one entropy
value, 0, for which cultural traits are not conventional at all. In these cases,
one outcome is guaranteed to emerge. For all other cases, traits are at least
somewhat conventional. Furthermore, there is no other “end” to the measure.
Traits can be arbitrarily arbitrary. This pushes strongly against a framework
where we class outcomes into “conventional” and “not conventional”. Instead
we should expect that almost everything is at least a little conventional, and
focus on the diversity of cases within the category of “convention”.
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While I have described this measure using basins of attraction, it can actually
be applied whenever we have some clear way to define probabilities for different
evolutionary outcomes. Let us discuss some variants where this is possible.
First, we sometimes have information about the starting point of an evolving
population. Maybe a nation is developing a driving convention, but has many
immigrants from a right-side driving country, i.e., a high probability of starting
with a lot of A players. In such cases, basins of attraction will not adequately
track the probability that each equilibrium emerges. What we can do is specify
a probability distribution over possible population starting places. This gives us
new probabilities for whether a population will start in each basin of attraction,
and thus allows us to measure the arbitrariness of the process.6
Alternatively, unlike the replicator dynamics, some dynamics are stochastic—
each starting point can end up at multiple equilibria depending on chance events.
Once again, though, we can redefine the inputs to the entropy equation to get
a conventionality measure. Suppose we model ten individuals playing the game
in figure 2, with x = 10. And suppose we simulate it 10k times, and find that
the A equilibrium emerges for 8% of these and B for 92%. We can take these
as the probabilities for the two equilibria.
There is another kind of stochastic model, often used by economists (Foster
and Young, 1990). These models include continued experimentation. At any
point, enough individuals may experiment with a new behavior that the group
changes equilibrium. An analysis of such a model sometimes measures how
much time, on average, a population spends at each equilibrium. For instance,
a group might spend 1/5 of its time at A and 4/5 at B. Once again, we can
use these probabilities to measure arbitrariness. Now, though, we measure how
much we learn upon observing what convention a population is engaged in at any
6Other than payoffs and numbers of strategies, we can now see how historical facts and
other constraints shape the probabilites of emergence for different outcomes. We will return
to this theme in discussing the way this measure is dependent on choices of representation.
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given time. For a model like this, notice, stability is reflected in the probability
that a population is at that equilibrium. Using this kind of model, the measure
can capture actually naturalness (3), stability, as well as naturalness (2) from
Simons and Zollman (2019).
As I will discuss presently, the measure can also be applied directly to proba-
bilities derived from empirical data. But first let us address a potential problem.
There are always multiple ways to represent or model any scenario, and
this choice will influence what the arbitrariness measure yields. For example,
suppose two friends decide which of their two favorite movies to watch every
week—Moonstruck or Raising Arizona. We could model this with the game in
figure 1. But suppose that while there are only two movies they like, they might
also decide to sit and talk instead. Perhaps this is quite unlikely because they
love Nicholas Cage, meaning figure 1 is a decent model. But if we develop a
game that includes this further possibility, it will yield a slightly higher level of
arbitrariness. We might imagine adding more unlikely possibilities to the model
and thereby increasing the measured conventionality.
Let us be a little more specific about what is at issue here. Actual chances
are not observable. We cannot know the real underlying probabilities for differ-
ent evolutionary outcomes. Indeed, many argue there are no such probabilities,
only our uncertainty about states of affairs. There are deep philosophical issues
here, and it is beyond this paper to address them. The point is simply that
the probabilities feeding into our measure must be representations of some sort.
Given this, there will always be different, plausible ways to choose probabilities
for any scenario. For example, in many real world scenarios it will not be plau-
sible to exactly define each possible strategy, and the exact payoffs associated
with each.
As we will see in the next sections, in some cases there is rich empirical
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data reflecting which conventions have emerged across human cultures. We
might take these to be the entries in our conventionality measure, and avoid the
thorny problem of choosing a model. This does not actually solve the problem,
though. For empirical data, just like models, choices have to be made. Different
conventional outcomes in a data set must be operationalized by the scientists
involved, and this almost always involves degrees of freedom (Longino, 1990;
Anderson, 2004). I.e., the data is also a (somewhat) flexible representation of
the underlying truth. And, again, the measure can come out different ways
depending on the choice. In addition, models cannot always be abandoned
because cross-cultural data often reflects historical influence between societies.
Some of the regularity in patterns of behavior results from these influences.
Thus there will be cases when, in thinking about degrees of conventionality,
researchers may want to use models to represent the “true” arbitrariness of a
process, absent historical details.
A further issue arises because, in addition to flexibility in representation,
there are often different things one might be trying to represent when it comes
to cultural evolutionary processes. These processes are extended in time and
space, constrained by other cultural factors, and shaped by surrounding cultural
influences. For example, if women in some culture hunt small game, this may
mean it is more likely that they also process skins from small game. How, then,
does one think about the level of arbitrariness of the emergence of gendered
division of labor in skin processing? In choosing a representation one has to
pick how many of these constraints and influences are included. These choices
will sometimes strongly shape the degree to which something “could have been
otherwise”.
There is not a final, ultimate solution to these worries. The best response
is that representations should be sensitive to the explanatory projects they are
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aimed at. If a researcher asks, “how conventional is the emergence of gendered
division of labor absent other constraints?” her best representation might be an
idealized model that considers how sex differences shape cultural evolution. If
she asks, “how conventional is food preparation in cultures with plough-based
agriculture?” she might want a data set of real patterns of conventional behavior
in plough-based cultures. As we will see, in some cases researchers might have
reason to compare arbitrariness across several different representations of the
same case. Of course, even a well tailored representation will not be perfect.
There will still be degrees of freedom in how it is created. The inherent limita-
tions in representations, and thus the measure here, should be recognized, but
should not be taken to prevent good (enough) inquiry.
With this picture in hand, let us briefly return to one more worry about
probabilities before continuing on to cases. If there are no real physical chances,
there is no real sense in which any convention could actually have evolved to
be otherwise. And, if so, there are no conventions in the sense developed here.
Recognizing that the measure is representation-dependent solves this problem,
though. We can specify what we mean by probability in the context of a par-
ticular model or data set (basins of attraction, probability of emergence over
many rounds of simulation, time spent at equilibrium, percentage of real soci-
eties that adopt a behavior) and set aside worries about probability and chance
in the world.
We now apply the measure to four cases of real conventions. The goal is
to demonstrate how this framework is useful in thinking about cultural evolu-
tionary explanation. Sometimes just conceptualizing of conventions as coming
in degrees improves explanation. Sometimes having specific numbers allows for
comparisons across different evolving conventions. Sometimes such numbers al-
low for comparison between data sets and models that might help with debates
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over just how innate different cultural traits are. In each case the goal is not
to settle the issues at hand, but rather to show in principle how this framework
can be applied to such problems.
4 Gendered Division of Labor
Murdock and Provost (1973), in a classic article, look across 185 cultures and
document who performs 50 different “technological activities” including things
like rope making, house building, and vegetable harvesting. They find significant
division of labor by gender. They also find, though, variation in the patterns
of division of labor for different tasks. Some tasks, like big game hunting,
are almost always performed by men cross-culturally. Some are predominantly
performed by women, such as spinning, laundering, and dairying. There are
many other tasks generally performed by one gender in any particular society,
but with variation across cultures as to which gender it is. Caring for small
animals, carrying burdens, and making rope all fall into this category.
In other words, we see a range of conventionality. In some cases, there is a
reason for one gender to adopt certain tasks—males have stronger muscles, and
females give birth, and thus big game hunting tends to be done by men (who,
in most cultures, are typically male). In other cases, there are no clear reasons
for either gender to adopt the task. In yet other cases, there may be some small
advantage to a task being performed by one gender. Let us develop a model
to represent this situation, and discuss how the measure would apply. Then we
will briefly discuss a real debate over the emergence of gender roles that benefits
from the account developed here.
Gendered division of labor is well-modelled by an anti-coordination game.
This moniker is somewhat misleading since the actors still want to coordinate,
but do so by taking different, or complimentary, roles instead of doing the same
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thing. In one household, for example, it is beneficial to have a few individuals
doing the dairying and others doing the well-digging, but you typically do not
want all individuals doing the same tasks. Most tasks require extensive skill
learning, and it is much more efficient when actors do not need to each learn all
the necessary skills of household management (Blood and Wolfe, 1960).
Figure 5 shows a game. Two actors in a heterosexual household choose
between some target task (dairying, rope making, etc.) and performing other
work that benefits the household.7 If they assign the task to just one of them,
they manage to coordinate. But because of sex based asymmetries, or pre-
existing gender norms, one of these assignments may be more payoff-beneficial
than the other. This asymmetry is tracked by the values of α and β. These
values might be equal in some cases, or a particular division of labor could
benefit one partner more than the other.
Figure 5: An anti-coordination game with the potential for payoff asymmetries.
Assume α, β > 0.
As we increase the values of α and β, the better equilibrium will slowly
become more and more likely to evolve under most dynamics. Figure 6 shows
basins of attraction for this game evolved under the replicator dynamics.8 As
α = β increases, the basin of attraction for the preferable equilibrium increases
as well. On the measure, then, this evolutionary scenario becomes less and less
arbitrary as α = β increases. When α = 0, the arbitrariness level is 1. When
α = 4, it is .47. When α = 9, it is .24. (Note that the particular values are not
7The assumption of heterosexuality obviously limits the analysis here.
8To be precise, this is a model using the two-population, discrete-time replicator dynamics.
Basins of attraction are estimated using 10k runs of simulation.
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important here, just the idea that we can formally characterize these cases as
varying with respect to conventionality.)
Figure 6: In a replicator dynamics model, the basins of attraction for a preferred
equilibrium get larger as it provides more payoff benefits.
Another alternative is to apply the measure directly to the cross-cultural
data gathered by Murdock and Provost (1973).9 Across their sample the hunting
of large aquatic animals has a conventionality of 0. (Only men ever carry out
this task.) Spinning has a conventionality of .52. (It is performed mostly by
women cross-culturally.) The making of leather goods has a conventionality
of .99, as it is performed by men and women almost equally cross-culturally.
Having the measure is useful here in that it allows us to compare these different
arenas, and the degree to which gender roles are conventional in each.
In the previous section, I argued that the representation used should depend
on the explanatory goals of a project. Notice that the two approaches just
9In doing so, I ignore tasks that are performed both by men and women in a significant
number of cultures. I also combine the ratings “performed exclusively by males/females” and
“performed predominantly by males/females” in the initial study to get numbers that are
more comparable to the game shown in figure 6. Of course, there are other ways to go about
this analysis. This reflects my earlier claim that there will always be degrees of freedom in
the production and use of data.
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described each have advantages, and disadvantages, that make them more or
less appropriate given explanatory goals. The real data does not reflect the
level of conventionality absent influence between cultures. The model, on the
other hand, avoids such possible influences, but is so simplified that it yields
probabilities that may not track real processes well.
Beyond the details of the measure, the general picture can help us think
about explanations for the emergence of gendered division of labor. Some evo-
lutionary psychologists claim women have evolved psychologies that disincline
them towards competition, and that thus explain why women tend to hold cer-
tain social roles. (See Buss and Schmitt (2011).) Alternatively, social structural
theorists argue gendered division of labor comes first, and creates psychological
differences between genders as they fill different roles (Wood and Eagly, 2012).
One complaint against social structural theory is that it fails to explain why we
have the gender roles we do. Because it does not appeal to function, it suggests
the roles are arbitrary, which does not seem to fully fit the data. Social struc-
tural theorists respond that ecological conditions determine which gender roles
emerge in the first place (Wood and Eagly, 2012).
But the picture developed here gives a much better response. Gendered
division of labor is arbitrary, but this arbitrariness comes in degrees. In many
cases, there is a strong sense in which patterns of labor are conventional, and
could have been otherwise. In other cases, explanations of gendered division of
labor should appeal to function, but only partially. In such cases, evolutionary
psychology’s emphasis on function as the primary determinant of cultural traits
is misleading.
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5 Language
Human language is a classic case of conventionality. It was so important to
Lewis (1969) that he introduced the Lewis signaling game to capture the strate-
gic situation of those engaged in communication, and to argue that linguistic
conventions can emerge as a result of expectation and precedent. But do lin-
guistic conventions come in degrees? And, if so, does the measure introduced
here apply?
Let us first consider conventions of semantic meaning. Some of these con-
ventions are more natural than others. For example, there is cross-linguistic
regularity in the use of “ma” sounds to refer to mothers because of constraints
on early infant speech.10 But it makes little sense to model most of these cases
with a game that has some set number of strategies. There are an extremely
large number of terms that might be successfully used to mean fork, or even
to mean mother.11 Some of these will be more or less likely to emerge for the
task (for instance, very long words may be less likely than shorter ones). It
is not practical, or useful, though, to give a model estimating the number of
possibilities, and their probabilities of emergence.
There are many other types of linguistic convention, though. And some of
these are more reasonable targets of analysis here. Below we consider three
examples.
5.1 Indirect Requests
As mentioned, Morgan (1977) and Simons and Zollman (2019) introduce notions
related to degrees of naturalness in thinking about conversational implicature,
and, in particular, indirect requests. An example is, “can you hand me the
10To give another example, the word “bo” apparently means cow in both Gaelic and Viet-
namese. Boooooooo.
11For this reason, cross-cultural data also will not be very helpful. There will be too few
societies that evolved the same sorts of conventions.
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salt?” which is stated as a question about the ability of the recipient, but is
actually a request for salt. The meaning, in this case, depends upon implicature.
The recipient is aware that there is no particular reason for the speaker to be
interested in their ability to pass the salt, but that there is a reason for the
speaker to want the salt. From this, and from knowledge about how human
communication usually works (for example, we usually speak about things that
are relevant) the recipient can infer that the speaker wants the salt, and is not
looking for a reply like, “yes, I can”.12
Previous authors have argued that pragmatic meaning of this sort is not
conventional. It depends on inference, rather than convention, in allowing effec-
tive communication (Gordon and Lakoff, 1975). Searle (1975), however, points
out that certain phrases are used to make indirect requests, and not others. For
instance, we would not usually say, “do you have the capacity to pass me the
salt?”. For this reason, we might suspect there is some level of conventional-
ity at play. Morgan (1977) argues that indeed it is convention that determines
which phrases are commonly used and immediately understood to carry their
implied meaning. Simons and Zollman (2019) agree and, in addition, argue that
the use of indirect requests itself is conventional, though using indirect requests
is a highly natural convention on their account.
Let’s consider the emergence of strategies that either use indirect requests
(IR) or do not (¬IR). Simons and Zollman (2019) give the payoff table in figure 7
to capture payoffs actors might garner for these strategies. This is a coordination
game with two proper coordination equilibria—IR and ¬IR. If actors do not
coordinate on the use of indirect requests, there will be miscommunication. For
instance, Orla might ask Liam “can you pass the salt?” and Liam might respond
“yes”. However, in this game, the IR equilibrium garners a higher payoff because
12Grice (1991) gives an influential account of implicature that includes certain maxims of
conversation, such as that one should be relevant. Though see Lepore and Stone (2014).
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in real languages indirect requests provide an easy way for speakers to be less
direct, and thus less rude, in making requests. Also, those using IR tend to do
better in communicating with those who do not than vice versa. Those who
do not conventionally use indirect requests will still be able to use pragmatic
considerations to understand such requests, but will fail to avail themselves of
the polite language their peers expect.
Figure 7: A game representing the use of indirect requests in a language.
In a game like this, with two options, the conventionality level of the problem
would be 1 if each option were equally likely to emerge. Here, though, the IR
equilibrium is more likely to evolve both because it does well against itself and
because it does well against the other strategy. The level of arbitrariness for
the problem is thus only .88 bits. These values can support the notion that
this strategy is, indeed, conventional (i.e., well above 0), but also partly natural
in the sense that there is some explanatory reason for why IR might typically
evolve.
5.2 Basic Word Order
Consider another language case. Basic word order refers to the order in which
subject (S), verb (V), and object (O) will typically be arrayed in a sentence.
There are six possibilities: SVO, SOV, VSO, VOS, OSV, and OVS. Different
languages demonstrate different canonical word ordering. (English, for example,
is SVO—dog bites man.) In other words, word order is conventional across
languages. Furthermore, the logical structure of this example gives us six well-
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defined possible outcomes of the cultural evolutionary process. Thus, unlike the
case of semantic meaning, this is a plausible place to apply the conventionality
measure.
Across 402 languages, Tomlin (2014) finds that 45% of these are SOV, 42%
are SVO, 9% are VSO, 3% VOS, 1% are OVS, and no languages are OSV. There
are various theories about why there is such an uneven distribution. Maurits
et al. (2010) give a partly functional account which appeals to the concept
of uniform information density. In order to reduce errors and maximize effi-
ciency, there are many features of language which spread information transfer
out as evenly as possible. As these authors point out, the word orders that best
preserve uniform information density are also common ones. I.e., there are func-
tional reasons to choose one word order or another, and yet also conventionality
with respect to what different languages settle on.13
There are different ways to answer the question: how conventional is a lan-
guage’s choice of word order? One option is to apply the measure directly to
the linguistic data. If word order were completely arbirary over the six vari-
ous options, its level would be 2.59. Given the real distribution, the measure
yields 1.57. In other words, comparing the data to a model where word order
is as conventional as possible indicates that there may be some contraints on
the evolutionary process, maybe the functional ones outlined by Maurits et al.
(2010).
However, these is also another way to think about the issue. Real languages
bear historical relationships to one another, which means that they sometimes
share common features as a result of these relationships, rather than in response
to payoff demands. This may explain some of the word order data. We could
instead construct a game to model how beneficial it is for agents to use different
13Their account does not perfectly fit the data. Our goal, though, is not to assess the
goodness of their account but to use it as an example.
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word orders. We could then use this model to measure arbitrariness on the
assumption of functional differences, abstracted away from historical influence.14
The arbitrariness in this model, compared to that of the real data, could give a
sense of how well functional factors might explain real patterns of word order.
5.3 Color Categories
Let’s consider one last case related to human language—that of conventionality
in color terms. Color terms are conventional in that in each language has dif-
ferent sounds to represent different colors. They are also conventional in that
each language groups hues into color categories differently. Some have just a few
color terms, while others have many more. In addition, the boundaries between
these terms are conventional. For example, some languages group green and
blue into a single color category, while in others light green and dark green are
two different colors.
There is a debate over the degree to which color terms are “universal”.
Human color space forms (approximately) a spindle shape where the different
colored hues—red, orange, yellow, etc.—circle the equator of the figure, and the
poles correspond to light and dark. Color categorizations divide this shape into
regions associated with different terms. Relativists argue that these divisions
are largely conventional, and mostly respond to human needs for clear communi-
cation given a set of perceptual and cultural constraints (Roberson et al., 2000).
Universalists, on the other hand, think that within the space are perceptually
salient hues—red, green, yellow, blue, white, and black—that act as anchors for
the locations of different terms (Hardin, 2005; Kay, 2005). These anchors, they
argue, explain cross-cultural regularities in color categorization. Both sides of
this debate recognize that color terms are at least partly shaped by perception,
14Although I will not provide such a game here, the work of Maurits et al. (2010) provides
a natural way to develop one. They use real data sets to calculate how close each word order
is to ideal, which provides error rates that could determine payoffs in a signaling game.
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and partly arbitrary, or conventional. The question is: to what degree do facts
about human perception constrain this evolutionary process?
The measure here could tell us something about both 1) the number of basic
terms used per language and 2) the locations of category centers and boundaries.
Let us consider 1), since this is a much easier topic to tackle. The number of basic
color categories across human cultures ranges from two to eleven (Berlin and
Kay, 1991).15 Berlin and Kay (1991) consider 98 languages and give numbers of
basic color terms for each.16 On our measure the conventionality of this arena is
3.01. If there was no regularity to these numbers, i.e., if we saw equal numbers of
languages using these different numbers of terms, the conventionality would be
3.32. On the other hand, if there were full regularity, i.e., if every language was
so constrained by perception that they used the same number of color terms,
the conventionality would be 0. One might argue that the comparison here
sheds light on the debate about universality. Alternatively, one might compare
these real conventionality levels to those that emerge in evolutionary models
of color terms that do or do not include perceptual salience. This would give
some information about how conventional the process is expected to be when
there is no salience, and when their is such salience, and thus provide more apt
comparisons for the actual data.17
In this section, we have seen three examples of linguistic conventions that sit
along a continuum of arbitrariness. In each case, understanding the emerging
patterns of behavior as both conventional and natural is perspicuous. Further-
more, this understanding can help with explanation. In the case of indirect
speech acts, we see that there is no reason to debate whether they are conven-
15A basic color term is recognized by all language users, used consistently, and applicable
to any domain (unlike, say, blonde) (Hardin, 2005).
16See their data presented on page 22.
17Universalists do have an explanation for cross-cultural variance. They argue that there are
stages of development for color languages. Again, the goal here is not to successfully contribute
to this contentious debate, but to give a proof of purpose about how the framework in this
paper might be useful to it.
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tions or not. They are conventions, but this does not mean there are no reasons
related to implicature that explain their presence. In the case of word order,
we can see that while information needs may give some reason for certain word
orders to evolve, this evolution can also be partly conventional. In addition,
the measure can give concrete ways of comparing data to models to get a sense
of the role of information needs play in constraining linguistic evolution. In
the case of color categories, we see two sides of a contentious debate where the
topic is the level of conventionality or arbitrariness of categorization. How well
can categories be explained by appeal to human color perception? To what
degree do we need to appeal to the communication needs to human groups? To
adjudicate this, formal tools like the measure here may be useful.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have supported the idea that conventions should be understood
as coming in degrees of arbitrariness. We have seen a number of examples where
only this sort of conception can make sense of the relevant phenomena, and allow
for appropriate evolutionary explanation. In addition, I have used several formal
tools, including game theoretic models and an information theoretic measure,
to clarify and support this picture.
By way of concluding, I want to briefly discuss biologial conventions. Under
Lewis’s account, there are no conventions outside of human societies. No other
animals have the abilities to meet his common knowledge requirements. But
when we move to an evolutionary picture, many of the models used to represent
the emergence of convention in human societies can be aptly applied to the
evolution of behavior in other species. The signalling game, for example, has
been widely applied to non-human animals, from scrub jays to vervet monkeys
(Skyrms, 2010; Searcy and Nowicki, 2005). If we take a bare bones notion of
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convention—a stable pattern of self-reinforcing behavior that could have been
otherwise—we can see that there are many biological cases that fit the bill.
Perhaps most importantly, there are many biological cases where explanations
of patterns of social behavior should appeal both to chance and to function. In
such cases, the measure developed here might be useful in thinking about the
degree to which evolutionary processes are constrained. As with word order,
and color categories, it might provide a useful tool, for instance, in comparing
data and models to give a better sense of how much ecological conditions, and
current phenotype, constrain the emergence of behavioral traits
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